The evasion of retirement insurance contributions in Croatia by Bejakovic, Predrag
www.ssoar.info
The evasion of retirement insurance contributions
in Croatia
Bejakovic, Predrag
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Bejakovic, P. (2016). The evasion of retirement insurance contributions in Croatia. Studies of Transition States and
Societies, 8(1), 20-35. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-62524-8
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY Lizenz (Namensnennung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY Licence
(Attribution). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
The Evasion of Retirement Insurance Contributions in Croatia
Predrag Bejaković *
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to investigate the evasion of retirement insurance contributions in Croatia. This 
problem can be connected to the weakness of the administration and the ineﬃ  cacy of the competent 
bodies, to high rates of contributions and a general lack of trust in the public pension system based 
on intergenerational solidarity. One of the most important determinants of evasion is the beneﬁ t 
deriving from the insurance, that is, the relation between the contributions and the pension. Insured 
persons who have worked their whole lives and have reached old-age pensions have an unfavourable 
ratio of contributions paid in and amount of pension received, because funds for pensions have been 
redistributed to several other categories. After a brief explanation of the pension reform, we draw 
attention to certain legislative inconsistencies connected with retirement insurance. The paper closes 
with a proposal for possible measures for the improvement of collection.
Keywords: retirement system, evasion and non-payment of contributions for the pensions system, Croatia.
Introduction
In Croatia, the existing public system of retirement insurance that is ﬁ nanced from current revenue 
cannot meet its obligations to the large number of retirees. Pensioners individually receive small pen-
sions, and yet the contributions for retirement insurance are very large, which inevitably gives rise 
to movements into the grey economy and employment on the black markets. The large payments for 
pension insurance (in Croatia it ranges around 12% of the GDP) could, accompanied by unfavourable 
demographic trends and the maintenance of the current situation, rise by the middle of the century 
to one quarter of the GDP. Along with the lack of a clear connection between the amount of contribu-
tions and pensions and an adequately eﬃ  cient control over the collection of contributions, it is easy 
for payment contributions to be evaded. As there are more diﬀ erences than similarities in pension 
systems, it is almost impossible to make general statements about the causes and consequences of 
the contribution evasion, but a critical analysis of the situation in Croatia can contribute to under-
standing problems in other countries of Western Balkan and/or post-transitional countries. Some of it 
has been presented in the article by Stanovnik et al. (2015).
Although there is a very comprehensive literature concerning the causes, features and con se-
quences of tax evasion (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972; Friedland, Maital & Rutenberg, 1978; Feige, 1979; 
Benjamini & Maital, 1985; Cowel, 1990; Feinstein, 1991; Beron, Tauchen & Witte, 1992; Graeme, 1997; 
Williams & Martínez, 2014), there has been relatively little attention paid to the non-payment of 
contributions to the pension insurance system (Yaniv, 1988). A reason for this could be found in 
the attitude that taxes are used to pay for public goods from which everyone beneﬁ ts (but no one 
directly), while the beneﬁ t from contributions is much more direct, and so those required to pay are 
thought to be more interested in the payment. The increasing reliance on and importance (burden) 
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of contributions, along with the simultaneous relative reduction of taxation pressure (Messere, 2000), 
has meant a certain redirection of evasion from taxes to contributions. This is particularly clear if 
there is no adequate link between contributions and pensions (in Croatian, referred to as doprinosi i 
mirovine by the appealingly symbolic acronym DIM [smoke]) (Mitchell, 1997), if the system is unjust, if 
the system harbours numerous high pensions received without the payment of any contributions, and 
if the payment of contributions is not a precondition for the acquisition of pension rights. Thus, there 
are similarities between tax and contribution payment evasion, but there are also diﬀ erences, mainly 
determined by the behaviour of those who are supposed to pay taxes or contributions. While there 
are some valuable sources regarding tax culture and compliance in transitional countries (Morris 
& Polese, 2014; 2015), the existing literature does not fully and/or systematically address the issue 
of non-payment of contributions; in particular, there are insuﬃ  cient analyses for post-transitional 
countries. The author tries to shed light on this relatively neglected issue and provides some proposals 
for improvement.
As long as there is no strong link between contributions paid and pension rights acquired, it is 
impossible to expect any greater willingness to pay them; however, in order to encourage payment, it 
is necessary (as with other forms of taxation) to endeavour to reduce the rates, at the same time as 
expanding the base on which these rates are paid. By including fringe beneﬁ ts (holiday bonuses, cost 
of living supplements, travel expenses and so on, or in the form of non-monetary income such as paid 
life insurance), Hungary, Latvia and Poland have expanded the base on which contributions are paid, 
so that they no longer look like income tax.
There is also a question of whether non-payment of contributions on behalf of the employee by the 
employer has consequences for the employee? It seems that the prevailing view in Croatia (also legally 
codiﬁ ed) is that the employee should not bear the consequences of non-compliance by the employer. 
In other words, his or her future pension rights should not be aﬀ ected. This is in stark contrast to the 
self-employed, for whom pension rights depend exclusively on the payment of pension contributions. 
However, it has to be admitted that social insurance institutions were never quite comfortable with 
this, perhaps viewing it as an open invitation for contribution evasion. Countries that tried to harden 
their position, recognising only periods for which contributions were actually paid as insurance 
periods, were quickly forced to ‘backpedal’. It is equally necessary to provide information about the 
importance and costs of the public good and to raise awareness that there is no such thing as a free 
lunch (Friedman, 1975), meaning that everyone has to personally bear an appropriate part of the costs 
of his or her own retirement rights.
The paper will evaluate the scope of the non-payment of contributions for retirement insurance 
in Croatia, and will indicate some of the causes and consequences. We will draw attention to some 
discrepancies in the law and propose possible manners in which they could be reduced. One part 
consists of a theoretical framework for determining the evasion of contributions. Furthermore, we 
draw attention to the situation and problems in the collection of contributions in Croatia, particularly 
regarding the evasion of contribution payment, and a proposal for possible solutions for improving 
collection. It looks like that in Croatia there is a weak link between contributions paid and the amount 
of pension, which demotivates the insures to pay contributions and causes the practice of reporting 
lower incomes. Finally, citizens should be aware that evasion of pension contribution causes under-
funded and ﬁ nancially unsustainable pension systems and endangers basic forms of social security.
A theoretical framework for determining the evasion of contribution payment
As with taxes, the age-old question of justice appears in connection with contributions. Should they 
be paid according to strength or according to usefulness? (Musgrave, 1985). The problems around 
the (lack of) justice of contributions began to be considered more or less at the same time as the 
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development of universal retirement insurance. Unlike taxes, there are no reductions or exemptions 
for contributions. If two people have the same wages, but the ﬁ rst person is married and takes care 
of children, while the second does not, should this breadwinner then pay less until his old age (and 
receive a smaller pension) and/or pay the same and get a higher pension? What happens if these 
persons without dependents start voluntarily looking after a parent who is incapable of earning his 
or her own living? Like income tax, contributions for retirement insurance do not take into account 
how much the individual has saved for his old age himself. Should contributions be reduced if the 
person him or herself has saved money? If the answer is yes, should then the amount of the pension 
be reduced? If the answer to both questions is yes, from the point of view of ﬁ scal justice, it would be 
correct to determine the amount of contributions according to expenditure for personal consumption, 
as a replacement for or supplement to income tax. This would be very diﬃ  cult to achieve in terms of 
organisation and administration, and would in practice very likely increase the costs of collection of 
contributions and carrying out supervision, reducing people’s willingness to pay them.
Contribution systems have various forms. The most common is the social insurance form, through 
which a uniﬁ cation of various kinds of risks is achieved, as well as a vertical redistribution of income. 
In principle, this system enables retirement rights after a relatively short period of insurance for 
those persons who have attained the necessary age and contributions history. If the basis for the 
calculation of contributions is wages, it is relatively simple to calculate contributions and pensions. 
Even if pay changes over the year, or if part of the wage is paid in kind instead of in cash, there are 
reliable administrative procedures for arriving at a fairly exact calculation (Gruat & Thompson, 1997). 
The condition is that the income be paid at regular intervals and that the third party (the employer) 
conﬁ rms the correct amount to the competent social security service. It is much more complicated 
if the income is not made on a constant basis or if it is paid by several employers. Diﬃ  culties are 
still more pronounced in the case of self-employed persons who (often incorrectly) state the income 
they have made themselves, the result being that this base is unrealistically low for the calculation 
of contributions, which is a frequent phenomenon in developed countries. In order to eliminate this 
kind of conduct, it is necessary to set up or reinforce, and properly to equip, labour inspectorates and 
the services that collect the contributions. The ﬁ ght against contribution payment evasion is a very 
complex task that cannot be done without corresponding legal powers.
A crucial question in the decision of whether or not to pay is that of justice and the validity of 
social norms (Song & Yarbrough, 1978; Lewis, 1979). In contemporary ﬁ scal theory, the viewpoint is 
prevalent that evasion of taxes and contributions payments is an endogenous variable; that is, the 
higher the rates of contributions for mandatory retirement insurance, the less people will be inclined 
to act in accordance with the law and, thus, create greater liabilities for themselves (Mitchell, 1997, 
Williams, 2011). It is hard to estimate whether there is an analogy between tax and contributions 
evasion, but it can certainly be believed that there are certain similarities. High contributions are 
the subject of extensive discussions among experts, entrepreneurs and politicians. Employers think 
that they increase labour costs and, hence, reduce the competitiveness of ﬁ rms and of the economy 
as a whole. Most economists say that the burden of contributions, including those that are paid by 
employers, is at least in the long term transferred to the employees, who bear it in the form of smaller 
wages. International comparisons support this kind of point of view. For example, in Denmark, where 
pensions contributions are low,1 the total costs of labour are not lower than those in France, where 
the contributions are very high.2 In Table 1 we give a review of the most important determinations of 
ﬁ scal behaviour and the decision of whether to respect the obligation.
1 From 1 January 2000, the employer’s contribution was actually abolished, while employees pay it at the rate of 
8% of gross wage (International Bureau..., 2016).
2 Since 6 April 2016 new rates have been introduced for Social security contributions (cotisations sociales). The 
employer rate is 8.55.6% of a worker’s monthly pay up to €3,128 (C1) for Old-age capped pension and 1.85% on 
C2 (3XC1), etc. for Old-age uncapped pension (International Bureau..., 2016).
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A system of deﬁ ned contributions has the advantages of greater transparency, which ought 
to discourage and reduce evasion, at the same time increasing national savings and encouraging 
the development of the ﬁ nancial market and institutions. On the other hand, redistribution to the 
relatively poor is easier in a system of deﬁ ned beneﬁ ts, in which administrative and managerial costs 
are on the whole lower. In a funded system (like that of Chile), through ﬁ nancing the individual bears 
the entire responsibility for his future pension (although even in this system a minimum pension 
does exist). However, in most OECD countries, there is a tacit intergenerational agreement that binds 
Table 1: The most important determinants of ﬁ scal behaviour and decisions about whether to respect 
obligations
Factors tending towards a rise in 
evasion
Factors tending towards a fall 
in evasion  
Source
high border rates of taxes and 
contributions 
Feinstein, 1991; Gaertner & Wenig, 
1985; Johnson, Kaufmann & Zoido-
Lobatón, 1998; Feld & Schneider, 
2010; Schneider, 1994; 2005; 
Williams, 2011; Bejaković, 2015
higher rates of pension contributions 
lead to a great reduction of the base on 
which contributions are paid
Gruber (1995), Bailey and Turner 
(1998), Rutkowski (2001)
a weak relationship between the 
amount of contributions and the 
amounts of the pensions
Manchester, 1997; McGillivray, 
2001; Enoﬀ  & McKinnon, 2011; 
Palacios & Rofman, 2000; 
Vukorepa, 2015 
the social environment of the individual — behaviour of friends and 
persons with a more or less equal level of income
Spicer & Lundstedt, 1976
mental calculations (the kind and source of income is important, i.e., 
the way in which it is made)
Winnett & Lewis, 1995
the level of income made
Benjamini & Maital, 1985; Erich, 
Maciejovsky & Schneider, 2001; 
Williams, 2011
the feeling that the supply of public 
goods is too large
Gaertner & Wenig, 1985; Cowel & 
Gordon, 1988; Hungerman, 2014
a high individual expectation 
of being caught cheating
Isachsen, Samuelson & Strom, 
1985
the greater likelihood of the 
oﬀ ender being caught
Pyle, 1989; Cowel, 1990
a higher level of awareness 
and better information about 
the role of public goods
Csontos, Kornai & Tóth, 1997; 
Erich, Maciejovsky & Schneider, 
2001; Williams, 2011
evasion of pension contributions is 
bound to rise if such payments are 
not understood as savings for a 
secure old age, rather as a tax for 
which nothing is obtained in return
Feldstein & Samwick, 1996; 
Manchester, 1999; Palacios & 
Rofman, 2000; Rutkowski, 2001
political questions and viewpoints 
about the rate of replacement (average 
pension as percentage of average wage) 
MacKellar & Ermolieva, 1999; 
Rutkowski, 2001
Source: author’s compilation
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those currently employed to pay the pensions of the current retirees, in the hope that their children 
are going to act in the same way. Experience shows that pension systems based on intergenerational 
solidarity can become completely ineﬀ ective, resulting in high costs without eliminating poverty 
among the aged (Feldstein, 1997).
Contributions to an unfunded pension system that are calculated on top of pay distort labour 
supply and forms of salary. Although the connection between the contributions that individuals pay 
and the rights that they can accordingly claim assumes that the obligatory legal rates of contributions 
increase the burden of the real border taxation rate, contributions to the pension system are in fact 
taxes with a considerable amount of loss because of the dead weight of the contributions (loss of 
prosperity above contributions collected). Feldstein (1997) estimates that losses due to the dead 
weight of pension contributions in the USA come to about 1% of the GDP, or about a ﬁ fth of the total 
revenue of the pension system. These losses are inevitable because of poor return that characterised 
the system of intergenerational solidarity. Unlike private pension funds and the pension accounts of 
individuals, the unfunded system of retirement insurance does not put the money gathered in bonds 
or securities, but pays the same sums out each month in the form of pensions and other rights. The 
rate of return that the individual can attain with obligatory contributions in the system of universal 
pensions insurance is, thus, much lower than what can be obtained in private pension funds or 
in retirement insurance with direct ﬁ nancing. Those who participated from the beginning of the 
retirement insurance programme and who are now retired, paid contributions at relatively low rates, 
but receive pensions (claim the rights) that are ﬁ nanced at much higher rates of contributions, which 
are in turn a burden upon those currently employed.
A further potential problem arises from the beneﬁ t formula and the extent to which individual 
beneﬁ ts match individual contributions. We can distinguish between: 1) persons receiving actuarially 
fair beneﬁ ts, 2) persons receiving an implicit pension subsidy, when the capitalised value of their 
contributions is lower than the expected value of the pension beneﬁ ts), and 3) persons paying an 
implicit pension tax, when the capitalised value of contributions is higher than the expected value 
of the pension beneﬁ ts (Cigno, 2011). If the beneﬁ t formula for the pension amount is redistributive, 
some will enjoy an implicit pension subsidy and others will suﬀ er an implicit pension tax, which will 
not motivate the payment of contributions. If the system is underfunded and if the redistribution 
level of the systems stays the same, transfers from the state budgets will be necessary, potentially 
increasing ﬁ scal deﬁ cits. Thus, the issue of redistribution involves the dilemma of how to share the 
ﬁ nancing burden more fairly across generations and between the same generations (Vukorepa, 2015). 
The evasion of contributions is particularly hard in post-transitional countries (PTC), where 
there are signiﬁ cant arrears in the payment of pensions, as well as a lack of coordination between 
governmental bodies and high contributions rates. Heinrich (1997) states the following reasons for the 
lack of eﬃ  ciency in the collection of retirement contributions in PTC:
– Poor administration. The competent bodies in these countries on the whole did not keep records 
about the contributions of individuals to the old age system of retirement insurance, hence, it is 
very diﬃ  cult or impossible to determine in any precise way what the link between contributions 
and pensions is. 
– High rates of contributions and any possible further increases have and will have very unfavourable 
consequences on employment. The administrative capacity for the collection of contributions is 
poor.3 The increasingly important private sector on the whole does not bear the appropriate weight 
of contributions, while the public corporations are frequently unable to pay their obligations. 
High rates of contributions redirect economic activity into underground operations. For this 
reason, with the widespread evasion of contribution payments, the possible increase of the rate of 
contributions probably would not mean any increase in resources collected. 
3 Stanovnik et al. (2015) underlined the importance of eﬃ  cient administration and collection of pension 
contributions, which is still lacking in the majority of Central and East Europe states.
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– General lack of conﬁ dence in the public pension system based on intergenerational solidarity. Young 
workers are being forced to pay a third to a quarter of their gross income into public pension 
systems that are on the verge of bankruptcy. They do not believe that the existing system will, 
however, provide them with the corresponding amount of material security in their old age.
These problems cannot be solved by reducing pension rights. Reducing pensions is hard to achieve 
politically, particularly since in most countries pensions have already been reduced in real terms 
because of inﬂ ation and their failure to keep up with pay rises. This is totally opposite to the main 
task of a pension system: the prevention or alleviation of poverty in old age. Furthermore, problems 
cannot be palliated by an increase in the rate of activity among the younger population. Considering the 
high rates of unemployment among the young, there is practically no realistic opportunity to solve 
the liquidity problems of the solidarity system by increasing the rate of activity among the younger 
population. 
The most important change in the pension systems of the post-transitional countries is the shift 
from interpersonal redistribution (payment for another in the solidarity system) to intertemporal 
redistribution (payment for one’s own insurance in the future). Because of the lack of a clear link 
between contributions and pension rights, the larger contributions are less likely to be paid and 
can even bring about disincentives to work and employment. Due to the frequent absence of data 
about payments that have been made, it is almost impossible to use formulas to calculate pension 
rights according to contributions paid during the whole working life, which would be an important 
measure in the prevention of contribution non-payment. At the same time, according to international 
standards the minimum number of years of contribution needed to claim a full pension is small, and 
the years in which no contributions have been paid at all are generously counted in. An additional 
problem is that contributions are paid on the total amount of pay (without any limits), while the 
maximum pension amount is actually limited. This also encourages contribution evasion, because 
payment above a certain amount of income does not have any eﬀ ect on the amount of pension later 
received. Kesselman wrote:
If the system is organised in such a way that there is no connection between contributions that are 
made and pensions obtained, then contributions start to seem similar to other forms of taxation. The 
lack of existence of this connection means that contributions are just another way of collecting public 
revenue. (Kesselman, 1996)
Again, if there is a weak link between paid contributions and the future amount of pension, there 
is no motivation to pay contributions. Furthermore, privileged pensions and high contribution rates 
can lead to the general acceptance of the viewpoint that pension contributions are just a kind of a tax 
and not a form of savings for old age. For this reason, there is nothing surprising in the fact that one of 
the most important assignments of the pension reform in PTC is the need for a stronger link between 
contributions and pensions (so that the contributions really should be the base of the future pensions) 
and the need to keep personal accounts about contributions paid in. The objective of pension reform 
and the development of a capitalised system is to provide greater personal liberty and choice to 
those insured, while at the same time underwriting the set minimum pension. At the national level, 
this should encourage the development of a market for capital, create incentives for investment and 
savings, and limit the non-payment of contributions.
Moreover, an important issue for improving contribution collection is the uniﬁ cation of the 
authorised service for the collection of contributions and the tax administration. Usually, the tax 
administration has greater knowledge and experience in the collection of public revenue, greater 
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ability to obtain the necessary knowledge about income, assets and the tax obligations of insureds, 
and since the administrative costs and compliance costs would be lower. Enoﬀ  and McKinnon (2011) 
detect several important preconditions for successful contribution collection:
(i) the organisational location of the collection function;
(ii) the age (or maturity) of the social insurance programme;
(iii) the degree of coverage and size of the labour force;
(iv) the degree of automation;
(v) the system and extent of coordination with outside organisations;
(vi) the application of a process of continuous evaluation and adjustment of collection policies and 
practices; and
(vii) social security ‘culture’ in a country.
With regard to the ﬁ rst factor — organisational location of the collection function — it deals with 
the question of who is responsible for the collection of pension contributions: the social insurance 
institution or the tax authority? Here, a generally accepted view among experts (Bailey & Turner, 
1998, McGillivray, 2001) is that combining the collection of social security contributions and taxes can 
improve compliance and result in a more eﬃ  cient use of resources. A similar position has also been 
stressed by Ross (2004), who believes that: “in principle, integration of collection activities will work 
best when both the social insurance agency and the tax administration are both modernized so that 
the task of integration can be narrowly focused on the transfer of collection functions.” Barrand, 
Ross and Harrison (2004) document the overall discernible trend of moving from a parallel collection 
system (with the social insurance institution responsible for contribution collection and the tax 
authority responsible for tax collection) to a uniﬁ ed collection system, with the line tax authority 
assuming responsibility for the collection of contributions and taxes.
Mandatory participation in a funded system of retirement savings would theoretically mitigate 
the problems of moral hazard (conduct of an individual deﬁ ned under the inﬂ uence of the fact that 
he is insured), adverse selection (some forms of insurance are bought precisely by individuals who 
will very probably have disproportionate beneﬁ t from this insurance) and free-riding (in which an 
individual enjoys beneﬁ ts of public goods that he has not paid for, which have been paid for by 
someone else). There is a mistaken belief that the development of funded retirement savings and/or 
voluntary retirement insurance will be an adequate precondition for stopping the evasion of payment 
contributions. In such conditions, individuals can believe that it is enough to pay the lowest pension 
contributions or not pay them at all, because the state or the society will have to take care of those 
who do not have adequate material resources when they are old anyway. Apart from that, in ﬁ rms 
(or branches of industry) that perform badly and/or do not operate within the terms of the law it can 
easily happen that an employer does not pay the contributions that have been deducted but instead 
keeps them for himself for a certain time or appropriates them entirely. These dangers are lower in 
a funded pension system, but this does not mean that they disappear entirely. Of course, achieving 
what is possible in theory requires good legal regulation and the objective supervision of pensions and 
investment funds, free from political pressures and inﬂ uences from interest groups. 
The next part of the text is dedicated to the situation in Croatia — ﬁ rst to pension system reform 
and afterwards to the evasion of pension contributions.
Reform of the pension system in Croatia
The Croatian pension system inherited excessively permissive eligibility criteria, which were further 
relaxed to build a social safety net. The system was repeatedly abused to grant favours to beneﬁ ciaries 
and was simultaneously squeezed to cut public spending. The pension system has faced the problem 
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of collecting funds for pension beneﬁ ts for a long time. As the share of contributions in pension revenues 
has diminished, revenues from the budget have become increasingly important. The share covered 
by contributions fell from 97% in 1991 to 53% in 2014. Thus, about 47% of the total monthly revenues 
needed for the payment of pensions come from the budget, causing pension expenditures to become 
one of the most important generators of the Central and also the Consolidated National Budget 
deﬁ cit. The total expenditure for pension and disability insurance is around 12% of the GDP, and rising.
The ﬁ rst reform of the pension system (the so-called small pension reform) in 1998 was directed 
towards better control of pension-related expenses. The new act gradually increased the retirement 
age (to 65 years for men and 60 for women) until 2008. The formula for calculating the pension was 
changed, so that by 2008 the entire work life span will be taken into consideration and not only the 
best consecutive 10 years (Anušić, O’Keefe & Madžarević-Šujster, 2003). This should also be a stimulus 
for paying contributions or at least not evading payment.
The Government started designing the big pension reform in the second half of 1995. The existing 
PAYG system was replaced by a mixed system in the beginning of 2002, consisting of a public PAYG 
system (1st pillar) and a mandatory fully funded system (2nd pillar). The second pension reform, called 
‘the great reform’, which was deﬁ ned with the Mandatory and Voluntary Pension Funds Act (OG 
49/99) and the Pension Insurance Companies and Beneﬁ t Payment Based on Individual Fully Funded 
Retire ment Savings Act (OG, 106/99), is based on the three pillars:
– The ﬁ rst pillar is a mandatory Pay-As-You-Go public pension system and all insured people should 
be included in the ﬁ rst pillar — employees, self-employed and farmers. All insured persons pay 15% 
of their gross monthly income to this system.
– The second pillar is a mandatory pension system, based on individual capitalised savings. When 
introduced in 2002 it was mandatory for all those aged under 40 to contribute 5% of their gross 
monthly income (or a quarter of their pension contributions) to privately managed pension funds. 
Those between 40 and 50 could opt either to remain in the PAYGO system or to move part of their 
contributions to the second pillar. Current retirees and older insured persons fully remain in the 
ﬁ rst pillar.
– The third pillar is a voluntary pension insurance system based on individual capitalised savings 
for those who want even more insurance against the risks of old age, disability and death. The 
insurance operates according to the same principles as the second pillar with one exception — the 
insured person decides on the amount of the contribution he/she desires to make in the pension 
funds.
Despite the reform, the pension system suﬀ ers from a number of ineﬃ  ciencies. These include 
a large number of early retirees, an excessively generous system of early pensions for arduous and 
hazardous professions and numerous special pension schemes. In addition, it is grappling with 
the consequences of the past explosion in disability retirement. As all types of pension systems are 
actually long-term obligations, one should not neglect the importance of retaining and/or improving 
the conﬁ dence in the pension systems through its fairness, stability and predictability (Vukorepa, 
2012), which is not fully respected in Croatia (Nestić et al., 2011, Nestić & Tomić, 2012). All these factors 
contribute to the image of an unfair pension system, which leads to demotivation of contribution 
payment and the evasion of pension contributions.
Evasion of pension contributions in Croatia 
Evasion and unwillingness to pay contributions to retirement insurance are very dependent on the 
beneﬁ ts expected from the system. One can conclude who the winners and losers in the system 
are. The retirement insurance redistributes revenue among individual age and income groups (inter-
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generational4 and intragenerational5), and for this reason it is necessary to study the diﬀ erent relations 
between the amount of contributions paid and the pension amounts received at the level of entire 
generations.
With respect to age structure, women receive more than men,6 while according to kinds, disability7 
and family pensions8 are set in a more favourable way than old age pensions. The same goes for 
pensions with a short contribution history, early old age pensions, pensions with privileged seniority, 
and those that can be claimed according to special regulations. Then there are great diﬀ erences among 
various insurance bases.9 According to the new regulations, rates of contributions10 for workers and 
tradesmen are the same, while farmers pay a lower rate of contribution, the diﬀ erence being made up 
by the national budget. Those insured persons who have worked their whole lives and have reached 
old age pension have the worst ratio between contributions and pensions, because there is a poor 
relation between contributions paid and the amounts of pensions, that is, there has been a major 
distribution favouring other categories.
Madzarevic-Sujster (1997) considered the forms and extent of contribution payment evasion. This 
author explained that in Croatia it most often involves declaring lower tax bases, the payment of 
wages via banks, unions or in kind, hence evading the payment of taxes and surtax. The amount of 
unpaid taxes and contributions is very much conditioned by the source of the income made, that is, 
by the industrial sector in which the person is employed. Assuming that the non-payment of taxes 
and contributions is less common in large ﬁ rms (because of the extent of operations, the need to run 
complete accounts and non-cash payments, and the fact that until recently they were either publicly 
owned or in mixed ownership), and that the earnings of self-employed persons and entrepreneurs are 
larger than those of ordinary employees, the author carried out two simulations.11 Madzarevic-Sujster 
4 In the intergenerational redistribution, older generations (retiring in the ﬁ rst 30 or so years after the intro-
duction of the comprehensive retirement system) had a positive transfer, because they paid contributions at 
relatively low rates and have pensions that are ﬁ nanced from the much higher rates of contributions now 
burdening those currently employed. The present and future generations will have negative life transfers, 
because they pay high contribution and will have a level of pension lower than that of the former generations 
(level of pensions as against wages).
5 In the intragenerational redistribution for the recently retired and those who will go into retirement in the 
future, the principle in general holds: the higher the earnings, the lower the beneﬁ t from retirement insurance.
6 According to former regulations, women could get old age and early old age pensions sooner than men 
and with a shorter contributions history, and they live on average longer (about 4 years), so for women the 
ratio bet ween contributions paid and pensions received was up to 30 to 40% more favourable. In the new 
regulations, the relation between pensions and amounts of contributions is still better for women than for 
men, because women have a lower age limit for old age and early retirement, but the percentage diﬀ erence is 
smaller, hence they receive beneﬁ ts for a longer period of time.
7 This partially makes up for the fact that an insured person, because of incapacity for work that has arisen, has 
not worked the whole of his or her working life.
8 Family insurance is set in the range of 70 to 100% of the pension of the deceased insurance holder and derives 
from the principle of mutuality and solidarity, and the insurance against the risk of the family’s breadwinner.
9 Employees paid about 50% more than tradesmen for the same pension, and more than double the amount paid 
by farmers, because the rates of contributions for tradesmen and farmers are much more favourable than for 
employees. There are also some retired persons (like Croatian veterans of the last war and the family pensions 
of defenders who were killed, set according to the pay for the relevant rank) whose pensions are not deﬁ ned 
according to contributions, and the amounts of contributions thus cannot be compared with pensions.
10 At the same time, the uniﬁ cation of pension bases for various categories of insured persons began, and in the 
future there should be increased activity in this area. 
11 In the ﬁ rst simulation, the amounts of the wages in small and medium-sized ﬁ rms were equated with the 
wages paid out in large ﬁ rms. According to this simulation, tax evasion and contributions evasion came to 
3.70% of the GDP in 1994, 4.34% in 1995, and 4.65% in 1996. In the second simulation, it is assumed that for the 
sake of some kind of social protection the real measure of employment in Croatia can be found in the ﬁ gures 
about active insured persons at the disposal of the then Retirement and Disability Insurance Fund, that the 
monthly receipts of active insured persons were equivalent to the average receipts in the economy (lower than 
receipts in the big companies). Thus, the diﬀ erence between the actually paid and potential contributions and 
income tax, evasion of contributions and income tax as a percentage of the GDP was 2.76% in 1994, 3.71% in 
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(2001), according to certain assumptions, carried out similar simulations for the period of 1994 to 
2000. Using the ﬁ rst simulation, she estimates that the amount of evasion of income tax and surtax 
grew from 1.5% of the GDP in 1994 to 2.7% in 2000, while according to the second simulation (after 
an adjustment for writing oﬀ  contributions and the evasion of contributions) evasion of taxes and 
contributions as a percentage of the GDP rose from 4.3% to 5.9%. The ﬁ rst simulation gives the lower 
limit for the evasion of direct taxes and contributions, and the second simulation gives the lower 
limit of the estimate. Henceforth, to Madzarevic-Sujster (2001), there were no estimations of tax and 
contribution evasion in Croatia.
Zuber (2011) wrote about the problems of collecting contributions for pension insurance and how 
they are statistically monitored.12 She also referred to the unequal position of insured persons: for 
those whose employment is the basis of retirement insurance, contributions paid are not a condition 
for being able to claim insurance seniority, while persons who are themselves liable to pay, the 
contribution paid is in fact a condition for being able to claim insurance seniority. The contribution 
rate for mandatory pension insurance in Croatia is 20%. All insured persons pay the same rate, but for 
persons insured in the second pillar the contribution is divided into two parts: 15% for the ﬁ rst and 
5% for the second obligatory pillar. The bases for the payment of pension contribution are stipulated 
variously for diﬀ erent groups of insured persons, in the range of 0.35 to 6 average salaries obtained in 
the period of January-August of the previous year. Linking bases for the payment of pension contribution 
with the statistically recorded average wage insures the automatism of determining the pension 
amount. Although the contribution rate is identical for all insured persons, an unequal contribution 
base for calculating pension contributions causes diﬀ erent ﬁ scal burdens to various groups of insured 
persons. Her survey shows that the same amounts of income are burdened diﬀ erently with pension 
contributions. Employees are the biggest group of insured persons and in the analysed period from 
2003 to 2007, for each 100 units of income, they paid on average HRK 24.54 mandatory pension 
contributions. The self-employed are signiﬁ cantly less burdened with pension contributions. In the 
same period, self-employed taxpayers of personal income tax paid on average HRK 18.56 mandatory 
pension contributions for each 100 units of income paid, while self-employed taxpayers of company 
income tax on average paid only HRK 5.00 mandatory pension contributions. In these circumstances, 
the self-employed pay only one third of the total obligation for pension contributions. The share of self-
employed persons in the structure of revenues from pension insurance contribution is disproportional 
to their share in the total number of insured persons. In 2008, the share of self-employed among the 
total number of insured persons was 8.6%, while they accounted for only 1.7% of total revenues from 
pension insurance intergenerational solidarity.
The survey shows that in the previous period the Tax Administration obtained better results in 
collecting contributions for the 1st pillar, compared to contributions for the 2nd pillar. For the period 
of 2002 to 2007, the estimation of non-realised revenues from pension contributions for the 1st pillar 
was in the range of 8% to 19% of collected contributions. In the mentioned period for the 2nd pillar, 
the estimation of non-realised revenues from pension contributions was on average 32% of the total 
sum that should be paid. For the second pillar a little bit more than two thirds of all contributions that 
should have been paid on personal accounts of insured persons have been collected.
1995 and 3.81% in 1996. However, one has to add to this ﬁ gure the unreported workers, who cannot pay social 
security, as well as the assumption that about 35% of all oﬃ  cially unemployed actually work in the EU, which 
would very likely result in the same percentage of tax evasion as in the ﬁ rst simulation.
12 Zuber states that in Croatia the ﬁ gures about the lowest base for the payment of contributions and the amount 
of insureds who pay contributions on the lowest base are known, while there is no information about whether 
these persons have, from the same payer, any income from proﬁ t sharing or dividends, which in many private 
ﬁ rms is the cheapest and most common manner of paying out wages. There is also no information about the 
amount of part-time work, and there are no indicators about the extent of occasional and temporary jobs, as 
they are called. The number of retirees is known, but it is not known how many pensioners make money in 
addition to their pension, or how much the annual sum of such earnings per pensioner might be on average.
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From 2002, the Tax Administration took over the duties and authority linked to the collection 
and payment of both pension contributions. This includes contributions for the intergenerational 
solidarity system, which are paid by the state budget as public income. It also includes contributions 
for the individual capitalised saving, which is paid to the private accounts of pension insured persons 
as personal property through the state agency (REGOS). The survey shows that in the analysed period 
the tax administration has achieved better results in the collection of beneﬁ ts for the ﬁ rst pillar in 
comparison with the second pillar of obligatory insurance. The eﬀ ective paid contribution rate for the 
second pillar is only 3.7%. It is especially worrisome that for more than 250.000 insured persons in the 
second pension pillar, contributions are paid irregularly. For this reason, Zuber (2011) believes that it 
is necessary to analyse in more detail whether it is justiﬁ ed to retain some of the existing solutions in 
the system of paying contributions, as well as the position of employed persons who do not receive 
wages or whose wages are paid irregularly.
In brief, in Croatia there are some obvious winners and losers in the pension system, the amount of 
unpaid tax and contributions is conditioned by the source of the income, while unequal contribution 
base for calculation of pension contributions causes diﬀ erent ﬁ scal burdens to various groups of 
insured persons. All these factors lead to the evasion of pension contributions. As an important 
positive step linked with the introduction of the mandatory fully funded private pension pillar, there 
is an obligation of mandatory recording of individual contributions for both pension pillars. In the 
following, there are some proposals for improving contribution collection. 
Proposal of possible approaches to improve collection
The reason for the non-payment of contributions in Croatia can be found in the incomplete or 
inadequately clear — or actually contradictory — deﬁ nitions in the laws and by-laws, and the frequent 
changes in legislation. Thus, in line with the mentioned warnings, it is necessary to reconsider the 
following legal provisions:
– The deﬁ nition of wages as the basis for the calculation and payment of contributions and for being 
able to claim pension rights in the Retirement Insurance Law.
– The justiﬁ cation of linking the basis for the payment of retirement contributions to the basis for 
the payment of tax only in the category of insured persons, who have their retirement insurance 
pursuant to their employment.
– There is a need to change the viability of a solidarity system in which the obligation of absolute 
solidarity is prescribed only for employed insured persons, while other categories of insured 
persons (like self-employed) pay retirement contributions in amounts that are not directly related 
to their monetary receipts from their occupation.
– The need to link the payment of contributions and the amount of pensions. This would stimulate 
collection, ﬁ nancial discipline and a greater interest of insured persons in the payment of their 
contributions, and lift the burden of contributions that has been shifted onto those who do pay.
It is necessary to systematically and resolutely halt the practice of allowing exceptions or 
exemptions from the payment of contributions. In connection with establishing ﬁ scal sustainability 
and increased eﬃ  ciency, the World Bank has long stressed the need for Croatia to do away with 
exceptions to or exemptions from the payment of contributions to the pension and health funds that 
in the past were used to bail out ﬁ rms in ﬁ nancial diﬃ  culties.
More up-to-date and eﬀ ective collection of contributions is needed, as is keeping better records 
about amounts paid, arrears, and about pensions paid. For the sake of more eﬀ ective supervision, it is 
necessary to seriously reinvestigate the low manning levels of the employment inspectorate, improve 
conditions of work and earnings, the possibility of further training, as well as to tighten the question 
of responsibility for the expert, professional and conscientious performance of inspectorial work.
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Through penal measures it is necessary to discourage the non-payment or irregular payment of 
contributions, and consistently and rapidly to try and penalise contributions evaders. Hence, it is 
necessary to provide the preconditions for greater promptness in the courts, as well as consistency in 
the handing down of penalties. 
It is important to develop a general level of awareness that the non-payment of contributions is 
not a heroic act of an individual or a manner of righting a wrong imposed by the state, but the shifting 
of the obligation of payment to another person.
Finally, but equally importantly, there is a need to improve the system of giving information and 
general knowledge about public ﬁ nances, that is, about the impossibility of maintaining the existing 
state of aﬀ airs in retirement insurance. Without improved information and general knowledge about 
the ﬁ nancial problems of the pension system in the reform of the system (and the inevitable reduction 
of rights for some categories of insured persons) considerable political resistance can be expected, 
likely to hold up and perhaps even block changes.  
Conclusion
If contributions for retirement insurance are understood as a tax, and not a form of insurance for the 
future, this can encourage working people to withdraw from the oﬃ  cial economy and work in the 
unoﬃ  cial one or, alternatively, to keep working oﬃ  cially, but pay the lowest possible contribution, 
by reporting an income lower than that actually made. In post-transitional countries, like Croatia, 
because of the absence of democratic, economic and regulatory institutions, the lack of experience 
in the payment of taxes, with simultaneous large discretionary rights by oﬃ  cials and a proﬂ igate 
government, it is very likely that there will be avoidance and evasion of taxes, corruption, extortion 
and other illegalities, which is almost always accompanied by the non-payment of contributions for 
retirement insurance. At the same time, the introduction of a capitalised system of pension insurance 
is no guarantee that the avoidance of the payment of contributions will be totally prevented.  
A close link between contributions paid and the amount of a pension can certainly increase the 
readiness to pay contributions, reduce the practice of reporting lower incomes, and be an important 
factor in the collection of contributions. To be able to claim pension rights entails the obligation 
of paying contributions. Croatia has already done quite a lot by collecting pension contributions 
via the Tax Administration, extending the accounting period for the calculation of pensions and 
the development of the capitalised system of retirement insurance; however, for the sake of more 
successful collection of contributions it will have to implement, consistently and without any 
procrastination, the appropriate measures, some of which we have put forward in this paper. 
Pension insurance is a long-term concern and eﬀ ects of realised measures are not likely to be seen in 
a short period. In the combined model of pension, insurance measures must be planned integrally, not 
just for both pension insurance systems, but also in respect to the totality of the social and economic 
conditions. Although the second pillar by its nature insures a stronger link between paid contributions 
and pension rights, there is also a necessity to enhance the mentioned link between paid contribution 
and the amount of pension in the ﬁ rst pillar. This can be achieved by gradual increase of legally 
stipulated retirement age as a precondition for obtaining pension rights, the stronger stimulating of 
later retirement and elimination of ﬁ nancial burden of privileged pensions. Additionally, the pension 
insurance system based on intergenerational solidarity should be complemented by a higher level 
of protection for insured persons, who due to the legal regulation or by their own decision, are 
insured in the second pillars. The successful fulﬁ lment of the obligation to pay retirement insurance 
contributions can be a large contribution to the implementation of the rule of law and order and 
respect for the law in Croatia.  Despite the diﬀ erences in the pension systems, such analysis on the 
evasion of retirement insurance contribution in Croatia can be a blueprint for similar future surveys 
in other post-transitional countries in the South and Central Europe and/or Western Balkan.
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